Documents and Laws in Parliament

The amendment adds an obligation for the government to obtain the opinions of several institutions before issuing a price assessment to regulate fuel prices: The Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Office for the Protection of Competition and the State Material Reserves Administration. These opinions must form the basis for the Government’s decision. At the same time, they are to be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies without undue delay, thereby strengthening Parliament’s information and control. The aim is to ensure expert assessment of the impact of price regulation on the market, supply and competition.

The amendment adds an obligation for the government to provide detailed justification for the issuance of a price assessment when regulating fuel prices. The justification must include, for example, the specific reason for the intervention, the grounds used, an explanation of why a more lenient measure is not sufficient, the appropriateness of the regulation, the duration and the conditions for its termination or modification. The aim is to increase transparency, reviewability and public scrutiny of government interventions on prices without limiting the government’s ability to respond to emergency situations.

The amendment specifies the conditions under which the government can regulate fuel prices. Instead of the general term ‘market emergency’, it introduces the more precisely defined term ‘fuel market crisis’. The law redefines specifically when such a crisis situation arises, for example in the event of a sharp increase in prices, supply constraints, disproportionate margin increases or threats to supply and economic stability. The aim is to limit overly broad interpretations and to set out more clearly the conditions for government intervention in prices.

The amendment changes the rules for the duration of government regulation of fuel prices. Instead of the original setting, where the government could issue a price regulation for up to 12 months and renew it repeatedly, the new maximum length is set at 90 days, with one extension for another 90 days. Any further extension would already require prior approval of the Chamber of Deputies. The aim is to limit long-term price interventions and strengthen parliamentary control.

The amendment extends the investment possibilities of participating funds of supplementary pension savings to securities of private equity and venture capital funds and introduces their legal definitions. It sets a limit that these investments may represent no more than 10% of the assets of the participating fund. If their share reaches at least 5%, the maximum management fee may be increased by 0.2 percentage points due to the higher management complexity. At the same time, it allows limited investments in shares traded on regulated EU or OECD markets, even in a mandatory conservative fund.

The amendment modifies the government’s reform of fiscal rules to maintain tighter budgetary discipline. It abolishes part of the changes that would allow the government to significantly increase spending without approval by the Chamber of Deputies and expand the so-called escape clauses when security risks threaten. It also maintains the special pension reserve account, so that any surpluses of the pension scheme should continue to be placed in reserve instead of being used for current expenditure. At the same time, it proposes that the existing stricter rules on expenditure frameworks and structural balances still apply for 2027-2028.

The amendment modifies the government’s reform of fiscal rules to maintain tighter budgetary discipline. It proposes to maintain the rule that pension surpluses must be placed in a special reserve account instead of being used for current government expenditure. At the same time, it abolishes some of the government’s proposals that would allow the government to increase spending significantly without approval from the Chamber of Deputies or expand the so-called escape clauses in the event of security threats. It also temporarily retains the current stricter rules for public spending frameworks for 2027-2028.

The amendment extends the possibility to exceed the expenditure limits of the state budget for the financing of defence from the originally set period until 2033 to 2036, if the expenditure exceeds 2% of GDP. It also makes it possible to exceed the expenditure limits for the financing of selected strategic infrastructure projects (e.g. motorways, railways, water structures, nuclear resources) listed in the Annex to the Strategic Infrastructure Act. The list of these constructions is firmly linked to the wording of the law in force on 1 January 2026 so that it is not automatically extended in the future. The aim is to increase the flexibility of the state budget in financing defence and key infrastructure.

The amendment modifies the rules for the preparation of the state budget and its amendments so that the procedures for amending the State Budget Act are clearly set out and the administrative burden of amending the budgets of certain constitutional institutions in agreement with the Ministry of Finance is reduced. It fundamentally changes the methodology of the fiscal rules: instead of the current system of expenditure limits and total expenditure, the law now explicitly introduces the primary structural balance of the public sector as a key indicator. This indicator is used to derive the expenditure frameworks of the state budget and state funds in line with EU rules, and a correction mechanism for management deviations is added. The proposal also allows for an increase in expenditure when amending the budget, provided that it is simultaneously covered by additional revenue or other specific resources.

The amendment makes mainly technical adjustments to the amendment to the budgetary rules. It clarifies the recording of non-investment subsidy actions by introducing a new requirement to indicate the date of entry into force of the decision on the subsidy or the date of effectiveness of the contract. It also simplifies the rules for energy service contracts with guaranteed results (EPCs) by removing the previous conditions and restrictions for their conclusion by State organisational units. It also aligns the effective date of the amendments regarding the SAO to January 1, 2027, to avoid interpretive confusion.

The amendment changes the method of financing the construction of low-carbon energy sources (especially nuclear energy) so that instead of direct financing from the state budget, funds will be provided from off-budget accounts subordinate to the state treasury. The Ministry of Industry and Trade will provide them to the investor as repayable and interest-bearing funds, subject to government approval, with the interest rate being derived from the cost of the national debt with a minimum of 2%. At the same time, the budgetary rules are modified so that the investor’s accounts are part of the Treasury system and that the expenditure on the construction of the low-carbon power plant is not counted towards the amount of public debt. The proposal also replaces the original arrangement of repayable financial assistance from the state budget with a new financing scheme through off-budget accounts.

The amendment introduces an obligation for the Ministry of Finance to publish state budget measures within 30 days of their approval in electronic form with remote and continuous access. The aim is to increase the transparency of the state budget and to harmonise the rules for the publication of budget measures by local governments. No new records are introduced, as the data already exist in the budget system, only new public access.

The amendment renews the obligation for the Ministry of Finance to submit to the Government a preliminary draft of the revenue and expenditure of the state budget and state funds. The proposal is to be submitted by 31 May and the government is to discuss and possibly modify it by 20 June. The obligation was abolished from 2024 to reduce administration, but according to the drafters, practice has shown that its absence reduces transparency and timely political debate on the budget. The aim is therefore to bring this step back into the state budget preparation process.

The amendment requires the government to submit the fiscal and structural plan to the Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies after its approval. The aim is to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny of the basic framework of the state’s fiscal policy. The committee will thus have direct access to the document on which other budgetary processes are based. The proposal is based on OECD standards emphasising parliamentary oversight of key decisions on public finances.

The amendment modifies the method of informing the Chamber of Deputies about the implementation of the state budget. It maintains the quarterly information to the Budget Committee, adds the obligation to include in this information an assessment of the development of the national debt and deletes the part of the text relating to the development of the state’s financial assets. It also stipulates that the Ministry of Finance must publish reports and information on budget execution electronically at the time of their submission to the government. The aim is to strengthen the control role of the House and increase the transparency of budget information.

The amendment raises the income threshold for assessing whether a household can provide its own housing from 1.6 times to twice the household’s subsistence minimum. This widens the range of people who can be considered as not being able to secure their own housing and receive support under the housing support system. The modification follows another amendment which simultaneously repeals certain provisions of the Act and changes the construction of the assessment of entitlement. The aim is to make assistance more accessible to households at risk of housing need who would not qualify for assistance under the lower threshold.

The amendment modifies the income limit for the issuance of a consent binding opinion by the Labour Office in the context of housing support. The current range of 1.3-1.6 times the minimum subsistence level is changed so that it can be set up to 2.0 times. The aim is to widen access to advice and support for vulnerable groups (e.g. single parents, the elderly, people with disabilities or victims of domestic violence) and to strengthen the preventive role of the law in preventing housing distress.

The amendment adds rules to the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies to strengthen fiscal discipline during the discussion of the state budget. The government will now have to attach to the draft budget information on the compliance of total expenditure with the budget rules and expenditure frameworks and justify any deviations. At the same time, it is stipulated that the recommendations of the House of Assembly for the revision of the budget must be in line with these legal spending limits. The aim is to prevent circumvention of the rules of budgetary responsibility during parliamentary deliberations.

The Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies discussed the government’s bill on fuel price regulation in a state of legislative emergency. The Committee proposed that the House conduct a general and detailed debate on all parts of the Bill and that the proceedings be concluded by 10:00 p.m. on 14 April 2026. It also recommended that the Chamber of Deputies agree to the Government Bill. The Committee Rapporteur was instructed to present the opinion and make legislative technical amendments.

The amendment modifies the rules for the response of the Government and the Ministry of Finance to a dissenting opinion of the National Budget Council in the formulation of the budget and expenditure frameworks. In all variants, the requirements for the justification of the disagreement are tightened, which must now include a quantification of the impact on the balance and debt, identification of risks and a proposal for corrective measures. In addition, the stricter options introduce an obligation to take compensatory measures for deviations from the fiscal rules or a procedural delay before the budget submission in order to strengthen the Council’s oversight role. The aim is to increase transparency, government accountability and the effectiveness of the Czech fiscal framework in relation to EU rules.

The amendment tightens the rules for deviating from the established growth in net expenditure in the state budget. The Ministry of Finance can now exceed the expenditure trajectory only up to 0.25% of GDP per year and only if it is in line with the limits set by the EU Council. The aim is to strengthen fiscal discipline, the predictability of budgetary policy and to prevent a gradual loosening of expenditure limits. The limits will not apply in cases provided for by EU law, when escape clauses are used or when the EU Council sets a different expenditure growth.

The amendment strengthens the enforceability of fiscal rules in case of a breach of the expenditure framework or the net expenditure growth rule. It offers three alternatives: an automatic reduction of the expenditure framework in subsequent years, an obligation for the ministry to prepare a corrective plan assessed by the National Budget Council, or a ban on the submission of a state budget that does not comply with the rules. The aim is to increase fiscal discipline, transparency and credibility of the Czech fiscal framework vis-à-vis the EU and financial markets. All options represent stricter national rules compatible with the new European fiscal framework.

The amendment tightens the fiscal rules by introducing an additional reduction of the state budget expenditure framework below the level set under European rules. It proposes to create a “fiscal buffer” of a fraction of GDP to strengthen the stability of public finances and create room to cope with economic shocks. It presents three options: a fixed reduction of 0.5% of GDP, a cyclically differentiated reduction according to economic growth (0.5% or 0.25% of GDP), or a more stringent reduction depending on the level of public debt (up to 1% of GDP). The measure is designed as a more stringent national complement to the new European fiscal framework.

The amendment clarifies the rules for convening a meeting of a committee of the Chamber of Deputies. If the committee is not fully populated at the time of the request, the number of members required to convene a meeting will be calculated only from the currently elected members, not from the total number of members scheduled. The aim is to avoid situations where vacancies make it impossible for a committee to convene and carry out its work, particularly in transitional periods after the establishment of the House.

The amendment adds to the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies the principle of proportional representation in the filling of the offices of President and Vice-Presidents of the Chamber. The same principle is to be applied to the appointment of the chairmen and vice-chairmen of committees, commissions and standing delegations according to the strength of the Members’ groups resulting from the elections. The principle is declaratory - it is not a strict legal obligation or a sanctioned rule. The aim is to increase the transparency, predictability and legitimacy of the distribution of functions in the Chamber.